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Abstract: Privacy amplification (PA) is a vital procedure in quantum key distribution (QKD) to generate
the secret key that the eavesdropper has only negligible information from the identical correcting key
for the communicating parties. With the increase of repeat frequency of discrete-variable QKD (DV-
QKD) system, the processing speed of PA has become the bottle neck restricting DV-QKD’s secure
key rate. The PA using Toeplitz-based Hash function is adopted widely because of its simplicity and
parallel feature. Because this algorithm can be accelerated with Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), an
improved scheme PA for Field-programmable Gate Array (FPGA) based on this is proposed. This paper
improves the custom FFT-based algorithm by reducing the number of computations and read/write
memory operations significantly. The correctness is verified when implemented in a Xilinx Virtex-6
FPGA. Meanwhile, the processing speed of improved scheme can nearly double the classical Toeplitz
Hashing scheme on FPGA through the actual experiment.
Index Terms: Quantum Key Distribution, Privacy Amplification, Fast Fourier Transform, Field-Programmable
Gate Array.
1. Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution exploits quantum mechanics theorem to accomplish the secure key
distribution. Since Bennet and Brassard proposed the first practicable protocol in 1984 [1], many
protocols have been proposed successively. These protocols can divide into discrete variable
(DV) protocols [2]–[6] and continuous variable (CV) protocols [7]–[10]. Because the DV-QKD is
proposed earlier and the security proof of it is more complete, the development of DV-QKD drives
to mature stage and many DV-QKD business systems have been developed [11]–[14]. We focused
on the research of DV-QKD and found that key generation rate and QKD system on chip are two
important research points of DV-QKD at this stage. DV-QKD is divided into four phases: quantum
communication, public discussion, key reconciliation, and privacy amplification. The first three
phases make two distant legitimate parties, usually named Alice and Bob, obtain identical random
sequence. However, in this process, some information is exposed inevitably to Eavesdropper,
usually named Eve.
Privacy amplification(PA) eliminates the leaked information by distilling the final secret key from
a long secret random sequence with universal Hash function [15]–[17]. Several classes of Hash
function has been applied to perform the PA [18], [19]. To reduce the finite size effect in distilling
secure keys, the lengths of input blocks for PA should be at least 106 [20], and this leads to large
length of processing blocks. Zhang et al. choose a simple multiplicative universal class of Hash
function to speed up PA process, and they construct an optimal multiplication algorithm with four
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basic multiplication algorithms [21]. The speed of this algorithm achieves 14.68 Mbps based on
CPU, but this algorithm is an iterative algorithm meaning that it consumes large resources and it is
unsuited for hardware implementation. Besides, Toeplitz hashing [22] is widely used in PA process
because of its simplicity and parallel feature. The authors in [23] proposed block parallel algorithm
to speed Toeplitz hashing. The authors in [24], [25] proposed improved block parallel algorithm
of Toeplitz hashing respectively. The algorithm in [25] achieves 64 Mbps processing speed based
on field-programmable gate array (FPGA) and reduces memory resources significantly. While this
kind of algorithm has reach its speed limit constrained of its algorithmic complexity O(n2). Fast
Fourier transform (FFT) and fast number theory transform (FNTT) are efficient fast algorithms for
Toeplitz hashing, which reduce the algorithmic complexity from O(n2) to O(n log n). The authors in
[26] firstly proposed a FFT based PA algorithm and implemented on Many Integrated Core (MIC).
The process speed of algorithm reaches 60Mbps with raw key length of 12.8M. The authors in
[27] proposed a FFT-based PA algorithm in CV-QKD based on graphic processing unit (GPU). The
speed of privacy amplification is achieved over 1 Gbps. However, this algorithm is only suitable for
CV-QKD, because it’s efficient in case of great raw key length and low compression ratio. Crucially,
the GPU and MIC platform are both hard to be integrated for its volume and power consumption.
Based on the investigation result, FPGA is a suitable platform for DV-QKD system with the
feature of high-parallelism and embeddable platform. More importantly, the energy consumption
of FPGA is much lower than that of GPU and MIC. Nevertheless, existing PA algorithms on
FPGA are all parallel block method of Toeplitz hashing with algorithmic complexity of O(n2). FFT
have great potential to accelerate the speed and reduce the consumption of PA algorithm on
FPGA. Unfortunately, there is no practicable FFT-based PA scheme on FPGA. The main reason
is that the 106 length of input blocks increases the difficulty and cost of implementation. To solve
this problem, we proposed a FFT-based PA hardware accelerate algorithm and implemented it
on Virtex-6 FPGA. The throughput of our algorithm reaches 116Mbps with the raw key length
n = 1M . It’s nearly 2 times faster than the classical Toeplitz Hashing Algorithm on FPGA.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The principle of privacy amplification with modified
Toeplitz we used is described in Section 2. In Section 3, the detail and the key improvements
of our FFT-based PA hardware accelerate algorithm are stated. In Section 4, we present our PA
hardware implementation module and experiment results, including the processing speed and the
requirements of the hardware resources. A comparison between several FPGA-based hardware
implementations is also presented. In Section 5, we provide a brief conclusion.
2. Related Work
2.1. Privacy Amplification
Privacy amplification is a process that allows two parties to distill a secret key from a secret
random variable about which an eavesdropper has partial information [15]. Before PA procedure
in QKD, Alice and Bob share a random n bits binary string W , while Eve learns a correlated
random string V providing t (t < n) bits of information about W , i.e., H(W |V ) ≥ n− t. Alice and
Bob wish to publicly choose a compression function g : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}r such that Eve’s partial
information on W and her complete information on g give her arbitrarily little information about
K = g(W ) . this procedure is indicated as Fig. 1.
Universal hash function [22] is discovered to suit as the compression function g for privacy
amplification [15]. The mutual information between the distill key compressed by universal hash
function and Eve’s information can be proved using Re´nyi entropy,
I(K; g, V ) ≤ 2−s/ ln 2 (1)
Where s = n− t− r means the security coefficient of PA.
Considering the security threaten of finite-key effect, the input raw key length n of privacy
amplification in DV-QKD should be larger than 106 [20], [28]. Therefore, the calculation of hash
function is very large, and the choice of hash function class is extremely important.
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Share n bits 
random string W 
Alice
Share n bits 
random string W 
Expose variable V
 to Eve, H(W|V)≥n-t  
Choose a function
g：{0,1}n →{0,1}r
Receive function
g：{0,1}n →{0,1}r
Send Function g to Bob 
and Eve knows
Obtain K=g(W)
H(K| g, V)≈r
Obtain K=g(W)
H(K| g, V)≈r
Eve Bob
Fig. 1: The procedure of privacy amplification
2.2. Modified Toeplitz Matrix
The Toeplitz matrix is a particular class of the universal hash functions [22]. Because Toeplitz
matrix is diagonal-constant matrix, Toeplitz matrix can be constructed by its first column and first
row and calculated by FFT. Therefore, the required number of random bits can be reduced to
n+ r − 1 and the calculation complexity can be reduced to O(n log n). However, the input length
of FFT would be n + r − 1 or 2n to calculate the Toeplitz matrix depending on the compression
radio, that would cost a lot of extra cost in hardware implementation.
Hayashi et al. proposed using modified Toeplitz matrix instead of Toeplitz matrix as the com-
pression function and give the security proof [29]. The modified Toeplitz matrix is constructed
by the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix (X, I). For instance, Eq.(2) is a
modified Toeplitz matrix.
Sr×n =

1 Vr−1 Vr−2 · · · Vn−2 Vn−1
1 Vr−2 Vr−1 Vn−2
1
...
. . .
...
1 V1 Vn−r−1 Vn−r
1 V0 V1 · · · Vn−r−2 Vn−r−1
 (2)
Using the modified Toeplitz matrix, the required quantity of random bits can be reduced to n
and the input length of FFT can be reduced to n. In this case, the length of FFT is only related
to the input block length of the key other than the final key length. This feature notably reduced
the design complexity of FFT-based PA.
2.3. Modified Toeplitz Matrix Calculation by FFT
FFT algorithm is a common algorithm to calculate the Toeplitz matrix due to the O(n log n)
calculation complexity of FFT. A general calculative process of the modified Toeplitz is provided
in this section. Xn = [X0, X1, · · · , Xn-1]
′
is the input sequence of PA. Yr = [Y0, Y1, · · · , Yr]
′
is the
final key sequence. Eq.(3) is the calculative process of the final key with the modified Toeplitz
matrix Sr×n.
Yr = Sr×n ×Xn = [Ir×r,Vr×(n−r)]× [ XrXn−r] = [Ir×r ×Xr] + [Vr×(n−r) ×Xn−r]=Xr +Y
′
r (3)
Make up the Toeplitz matrix Vr×(n−r) to the cyclic matrix, then the calculation of Y
′
r can be
accelerated by FFT shown as Eq.(4).
[
P(n−r)×(n−r) ×Xn−r
Y
′
r
]=[P(n−r)×(n−r) ×Xn−r
Vr×(n−r) ×Xn−r ]=
[
P(n−r)×r P(n−r)×(n−r)
Pr×r Vr×(n−r)
]
× [ 0
Xn−r
]
= Vn ⊗X′n = IFFT(FFT(Vn) • FFT(X
′
n))
(4)
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Vn = [V0, V1, · · · , Vn] is the description of Toeplitz matrix, X′n = [0, 0, · · · , Xn−r, · · · , Xn−1]
′
is
a part of the input sequence. The matrix P aims to complement the Toeplitz matrix Vr×(n−r) to
cyclic matrix.
3. High Speed FFT-based Privacy Amplification Hardware Scheme
A high speed PA hardware scheme for FPGA implementation is proposed in this section. An
overall process of the scheme is given based on FFT algorithm. Furthermore, three points of
Algorithm optimization are given in accordance with the feature of privacy amplification.
3.1. Overall Process of FFT-based PA Hardware Schemes
The overall process of FFT-based PA Hardware Scheme is indicated as Fig.2. The pre-processing
phase divides the input sequence Xn = [X0, X1, · · · , Xn-1]
′
into Xr = [X0, X1, · · · , Xr-1, 0, · · · , 0]
′
and Xn−r = [0, 0, · · · , 0, Xr, · · · , Xn−1]
′
. The dot operational character means the dot product of
the two FFT results. The post-processing phase rounds the result of IFFT to Boolean sequence.
The final key sequence of PA is the XOR result of Xn−r and the result of the Toeplitz cyclic
convolution.
nX Pre-processing FFT
nV FFT
IFFT Post-processing
rX
n-rX
rY
Fig. 2: The Overall Process of FFT-based PA Hardware Scheme
The calculation of FFT/IFFT needs the greatest computation in the entire process. Although
special hardware circuits for FFT/IFFT is provided in FPGA, the input length of these circuits
cant satisfy the request of PA. Concerning this issue, two-dimensional long FFT algorithm [30] is
adopted to calculate long FFT with small point FFT core. the procedure of custom 2-D long FFT
algorithm is described as Algorithm 1 .
In this way the calculation of FFT and IFFT can be accomplished with multiple small point FFT
cores at high speed. However, this algorithm needs matrix transposition and storage repeatedly,
that leads to large amount of memory read and write operations. Thus, the data transfer rate
of memory is the bottleneck of the entire PA algorithm. Aiming at such shortcomings, several
optimizations are proposed to reduce the amount of storage data and improve the processing
speed according to the feature of PA.
3.2. Real-valued FFT Acceleration
The input sequence Xn and the description of Toeplitz Vn are both real sequences, but the FFT
hardware circuits are designed to compute the FFT of a complex sequence. Most FFT-based
PA scheme regards the input sequence as the real part and sets imaginary part to 0 directly .
This method leads to a waste of computing resource and storage resource. A real-valued FFT
algorithm [31] is introduced in our method to solve this problem. With this algorithm, two real-
valued FFT calculations can be accomplished by one complex-valued FFT. In our scheme, we
need the FFT results of the input sequence and the Toeplitz sequence. We can get the results in
one complex-valued FFT with the method described as below.
z(n) = x(n) + i · v(n) (5)
Z(k) = FFT (z(n)) (6)
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Re[X(k)] = 1/2 · (Re[Z(k)] + Re[Z(N − k)]) (7)
Im[X(k)] = 1/2 · (Im[Z(k)]− Im[Z(N − k)]) (8)
Re[V (k)] = 1/2 · (Im[Z(k)] + Im[Z(N − k)]) (9)
Im[V (k)] = 1/2 · (Re[Z(N − k)]− Re[Z(k)]) (10)
This optimization accomplishes the FFT of two sequence with one complex-valued FFT operation,
improving the processing rate and saving nearly half of the computing resource and storage
resource.
Algorithm 1 Custom 2-Dimensional Long FFT of x
Input: Xn = x0, x1, · · · , xn−1
Output: Yn = FFT (Xn)
1: Convert one-dimensional input sequence Xn into two-dimensional matrix Ak×k
2: A
′
= Transposed(A) // Transposed(A) is the transpose function of the matrix A
3: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
4: A1[i][0 : k − 1] = FFT (A′ [i][0 : k − 1])
5: end for
6: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
7: for j = 0 to k − 1 do
8: A2[i][j] = A1[i][j]×W [i× j] //W is the multiply rotation factor
9: end for
10: end for
11: A
′
2 = Transposed(A2)
12: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
13: A3[i][0 : k − 1] = FFT (A′2[i][0 : k − 1])
14: end for
15: A
′
3 = Transposed(A3)
16: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
17: for j = 0 to k − 1 do
18: Y [i× k + j] = A′3[i][j]
19: end for
20: end for
3.3. A Modified 2D-FFT for PA
The matrix transposition and storage operation of long FFT algorithm will cost an amount of time.
Nevertheless, in the PA, the unconditional secure key is the final result of PA and the security of
the key is not affected by the input sequence of the origin key and the export order of the final
key. Therefore, the input and output order of FFT algorithm result is also out of consideration
in PA algorithm. Without regard to the order of FFT algorithm, the procedure of long FFT/IFFT
algorithm mentioned earlier (3.1) can be simplified as follow:
In this way the matrix transformation and storage that the long FFT/IFFT algorithm needs
will significantly decrease. Taking the one-million points PA algorithm as an example, the output
sequence of the PA algorithm with the natural order FFT and the unnatural order FFT is indicated
as fig.3.
Because our one-million points PA algorithm is based on the two-dimensional FFT algorithm, the
input sequence will be loaded into a 1024-demensional matrix. If the matrix is processed row by
row in the two-dimensional FFT algorithm, the input and output sequence of the PA algorithm with
the natural order FFT is identical to that in Fig. 3 (a). Meanwhile, the input and output sequence
of the PA algorithm with the unnatural order FFT is shown in Fig. 3 (b) in the column-by-column
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Algorithm 2 Modified 2-D FFT for PA
Input: Xn = x0, x1, · · · , xn−1
Output: Yn = FFT (Xn)
1: Convert one-dimensional input sequence Xn into two-dimensional matrix Ak×k
2: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
3: A1[i][0 : k − 1] = FFT (A[i][0 : k − 1])
4: end for
5: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
6: for j = 0 to k − 1 do
7: A2[i][j] = A1[i][j]×W [i× j] //W is the multiply rotation factor
8: end for
9: end for
10: A
′
2 = Transposed(A2)// Transposed(A) is the transpose function of the matrix A
11: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
12: A3[i][0 : k − 1] = FFT (A′2[i][0 : k − 1])
13: end for
14: for i = 0 to k − 1 do
15: for j = 0 to k − 1 do
16: Y [i× k + j] = A3[i][j]
17: end for
18: end for
C1022
R0
C1023
R0
C0
R0
C1
R0
C0
R1
C1
R1
C1022
R1
C1023
R1
C2
R0
C2
R1
C1021
R0
C1021
R1
C0
R2
C1
R2
C2
R2
C1021
R2
C1022
R2
C1023
R2
C0
R1021
C1
R1021
C0
R1022
C1
R1022
C2
R1021
C2
R1022
C0
R1023
C1
R1023
C2
R1023
C1021
R1021
C1022
R1021
C1021
R1022
C1022
R1022
C1023
R1021
C1023
R1022
C1021
R1023
C1022
R1023
C1023
R1023
……
……
…
…
…
…
(a)Custom 2-D FFT
C1022
R0
C1023
R0
C0
R0
C1
R0
C0
R1
C1
R1
C1022
R1
C1023
R1
C2
R0
C2
R1
C1021
R0
C1021
R1
C0
R2
C1
R2
C2
R2
C1021
R2
C1022
R2
C1023
R2
C0
R1021
C1
R1021
C0
R1022
C1
R1022
C2
R1021
C2
R1022
C0
R1023
C1
R1023
C2
R1023
C1021
R1021
C1022
R1021
C1021
R1022
C1022
R1022
C1023
R1021
C1023
R1022
C1021
R1023
C1022
R1023
C1023
R1023
(b) Modified 2-D FFT for PA
Fig. 3: the Input/Output Sequence Order Diagram of FFT
mode. The unnatural order optimizing changes the sequence of the final key and doesnt affect
the security of the final key. The times of matrix transposition and storage operation is decreased
from six times to twice.
3.4. Fast Matrix Transposition
Although modified 2D-FFT algorithm has decreased the matrix transposition times to twice, the
matrix transposition still spends a lot of time. A high effective matrix transposition method [32] is
introduced in our scheme. Due to the access mechanism of DDR-SDRAM, the row span access
operation will reduce the access speed of DDR. However, the matrix transposition needs a large
amount of the row span access operations. The high effective matrix transposition method uses
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the matrix partitioning technology to reduce the times of the row span access operation. Taking
the one-million points PA algorithm as an example, the main process of the common matrix
transposition based on the DDR memory model is indicated as Fig. 4.
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Fig. 4: the Common Matrix Transposition Process
The row span access operation times of the common matrix transposition is calculated as Eq.
11:
Trow−span = Twrite + Tread = 1024 + 1024× 1024= 1049600 (11)
The high effective matrix transposition method uses the matrix partitioning technology to balance
the row span access times of the read operation and the write operation. This method can reduce
the total row span access times and increase the data rates significantly. the main process of the
high effective matrix transposition is indicated as Fig.5.
In this case, each row of the matrix is transformed to a 32-dimension matrix. The row span
access operation times of the high effective matrix transposition method is calculated as follow:
Trow−span = Twrite + Tread = 32× 1024 + 32× 1024 = 65536 (12)
This method reduces the row span access times obviously. This method is experimented with the
DDR3-SDRAM to prove its improvement on the data rates of matrix transposition. The comparison
experiment result of the two methods is indicated in TABLE I.
TABLE I: the High Effective Matrix Transposition Experiment Result
Data Size Matrix Format Operation time Average rate
The common method 64Mb 1024× 1024 8.959 us 7.14Gbps
The high effective method 64Mb 1024× 1024 3.242 us 19.74Gbps
According to the experiment results, the high effective Matrix Transposition method can double
the data rata of matrix transposition.
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Fig. 5: the High Effective Matrix Transposition Process
4. Implementations and Results
Our PA scheme is implemented on the ML605 Evaluation Kit. The kit is based on a Virtex-6
XC6VLX240T-1FFG1156 FPGA with 241,152 logic cells. The kit also contains a 512MB DDR3
SDRAM to support our scheme. The overall structure of our PA scheme is shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6: the overall structure of the PA scheme
The input data buffer is designed to store the input key and the Toeplitz random sequence. On
output, It also converts the data to the floating-points for the FFT convolution. The PA Control
module is the core controller of the PA module. It controls the FFT convolution unit to accomplish
the PA computational tasks. The FFT convolution unit is the key unit in PA module. It contains
five major parts. The FFT core is designed to calculate the FFT on each row of the matrix. Two
FFT IP-Cores provided by Xilinx are used to meet the speed requirements. The length of the FFT
IP-Core is set as 1024 in one million points PA scheme. Similarly, The IFFT core is designed to
calculate the IFFT on each column or row of the matrix. two FFT IP-Cores are used and their
length also set as 1024. The multiply unit completes the computational task of the real-valued
FFT accelerated optimizing. The rotator factory multiply unit point-wisely multiply rotation factors by
the result of FFT/IFFT core to accomplish the two-dimensional FFT algorithm. The data distribute
unit distributes the data for the calculation units and exchanges data with SDRAM controller.
We simulated the scheme using the simulation tool Modelsim and verified the correctness of the
scheme with the result on Matlab . Then the scheme was implemented on a ML605 Evaluation Kit
and the result is accord with the simulation. The resource utilization of the PA scheme in hardware
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is shown in TABLE II. According to the resource utilization above, there is enough spare resource
for other modules to constitute the post-processing system on one chip with the PA module.
TABLE II: the resource utilization of the PA scheme
The scheme used XC6VLX240T Available Utilization rate
Number of LUTs 37203 150720 24%
Number of 36K BRAMs 164 416 39%
Number of 18K BRAMs 66 832 7%
Number of DSP48E1s 360 768 46%
The comparison of several FPGA-based implementations of PA scheme is indicated in TABLE
III. The schemes in [23], [24], [25] are all based on the linear feedback shift register(LFSR) to
calculate the Toeplitz matrix. This kind of scheme can be high speed and resource-saving when the
compression ratio of PA is low and fixed. When the compression ratio of PA is high or floated, the
resource consumption of PA will rapidly increase. The FFT-based PA algorithm implementation isnt
affected by the compression ratio, so its easy to implement the wide-range variable compression
ratio with our PA scheme. Unlike the LFSR-based PA algorithm, the processing speed of the
FFT-based PA algorithm is mainly limited by the memory transfer rate instead of the resource of
FPGA. The processing speed of our PA scheme can reach 116Mbps and it can increase sharply
with faster memory (e.g. DDR4-DRAM).
TABLE III: the comparison of several FPGA-based PA schemes
This Work Yang et al. [25] Constantin et al. [24] Zhang et al. [23]
Devices Xilinx Virtex-6 Xilinx Virtex-7 Xilinx Virtex-6 Cyclone III
Length of the final key 0-1,000,000 0-1,000,000 0-995,328 76,800
LUTs 37,203 26,571 15,604 1,902
BRAM 7,092kb 100kb 0kb 656kb
Clock frequency 200MHz 100MHz 125MHz 40MHz
Max. processing speed 116Mbps 64Mbps 41Mbps 0.7Mbps
5. Conclusions and Outlook
This paper provides a high-speed PA hardware scheme and its implementation in FPGA based
on the FFT. The verification is accomplished on the Virtex-6 FPGA and the processing speed of
the scheme can reach 116Mbps. Compared with other work, the proposed PA scheme supports
wide-range and variable compression ratio and can reach faster processing speed with faster
memory . The optimizing proposed in this paper can also improve the FFT-based PA algorithm
on other platforms, such as CPU and GPU. In the future, we will research on the relationship
between the precision of FFT and the safety of PA and try to replace the floating-point FFT with
fixed-point FFT in PA algorithm to reduce the resource consumption.
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